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Introduction
Nelson Pike is often credited with offering the most 
compelling formulation of an ancient argument 
against human freedom.1 According to Pike, God’s 
foreknowledge that we will perform some action is 
inconsistent with our freedom to do otherwise. If 
freedom requires the freedom to do otherwise, then 
God’s foreknowledge undermines our freedom. Di-
vine foreknowledge that we will perform some action 
makes alternative actions unavailable to us. 
Perhaps the most compelling set of counterarguments 
to Pike’s conclusion have been advanced by Ockha-
mists who distinguish hard facts and soft facts and ar-
gue that divine foreknowledge about what we will do 
is not a hard fact in the past.
. . . Ockham distinguished between two kinds of 
past facts. One kind of past fact is genuinely and 
solely about the past; we might call this kind of 
fact a ‘hard’ fact about the past. Another kind of 
fact is not both genuinely and solely about the 
past; such a fact is a ‘soft’ fact about the past. The 
key claim of Ockham is that soft facts about the 
past do not carry the necessity that attends hard 
facts about the past.2 
God’s foreknowledge is not a hard fact that is coun-
terfactually independent of anything we can do now.3 
Divine foreknowledge that we will perform some ac-
tion does not, on the Ockhamist account, make alter-
native actions unavailable to us. 
John Martin Fischer has argued that the best versions 
of Pike’s argument for theological fatalism depend 
on a principle of the fixity of the past. According to 
principles of fixity, the past—or significant parts of 
the past—are indeed counterfactually independent of 
anything we can do now. There are, most importantly, 
no true backtracking counterfactuals p > q such that p 
is a sentence describing something I can do now—say, 
mow the lawn at time t—and q is a sentence describ-
ing God’s foreknowledge that, say, I will not mow the 
lawn at time t. If God knows at 50 A.D. that I will 
not mow the lawn at t, then, according to Fischer, that 
knowledge is among the hard facts in the past. The 
hard facts in the past are all of those facts that are over 
and done with, and totally independent of anything I 
can now do.
The principle of the fixity of the past is not implausi-
ble—indeed I’m prepared to concede, for the sake of 
discussion, the principle of the total fixity of the past. 
The principle of the total fixity of the past entails that 
there are no facts in the past that are not over and 
done with in the sense described. There are no facts 
about the past that are not causally independent of 
anything we can do now. It follows from total fixity 
that the set of all past facts is just a set of hard facts.4 
Total fixity of course entails that God’s foreknowl-
edge is among the hard facts. 
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My aim in the paper is to show that the arguments 
for theological fatalism from God’s foreknowledge 
and total fixity—or any principle of fixity—are un-
sound. The problem with arguments from foreknowl-
edge and fixity is the failure to directly address issues 
of persistence through times and worlds. But issues of 
persistence—the persistence of persons and objects—
are central to the argument for theological fatalism. 
The commonsense explanation of persistence is the 
endurantist account of persistence. Endurantism is the 
thesis that persons and objects persist through time 
by being wholly present at various temporal locations. 
According to endurantism I persist while driving to 
work by being wholly present in the car at each mo-
ment of the drive. There is no temporal part of me 
that enters the car at home that is diverse from a tem-
poral part of me that exits the car at work. Similarly, 
ordinary objects persist through time by being wholly 
present at each moment. The table you see today in 
your living room is the table that was there yesterday. 
It is not a temporal part or temporal stage of the table 
diverse from earlier temporal parts or stages of the 
table.
Endurantism explains how the proposition that I 
mow the lawn at some time t and the proposition 
that I—that is, the self-same or identical individual—
might have failed to mow the lawn at t are consist-
ent with each other. Endurantism also affords a nice 
and natural explanation of how divine foreknowledge 
and the total fixity of the past are consistent with the 
proposition that I mow the lawn at t and the proposi-
tion that I might have—I could have or I had it in my 
power—not to mow the lawn at t. 
Fischer on Fixity
According to the traditional conception of God, the 
properties of God include essential omniscience, 
omnipotence, perfectly goodness and necessary ex-
istence. These are the de re modal properties tradi-
tionally ascribed to a maximally great being. Essential 
omniscience entails, at least, knowledge of every true 
proposition. It might entail in addition knowledge of 
every indefinitely true proposition and, perhaps, de 
se knowledge.5 Arguments for theological fatalism 
assume that the traditional God is also essentially 
sempiternal. Sempiternity is omnitemporality, or ex-
istence at every temporal location. 
Nelson Pike’s original formulation of the argument 
for theological fatalism implicitly assumes a power en-
tailment principle. Power entailment principles state 
that what an agent can do, or has the power to do, at 
any time is closed under entailment. If an agent can 
do A and A entails B then the agent can do B. Pow-
er entailment principles are, of course, controversial.6 
Raising my hand entails that 2 + 2 = 4, for instance, 
but I cannot bring it about that 2 + 2 = 4. Raising 
my hand also entails that I exist, but I cannot bring 
it about that I exist. There are, of course, a number of 
other innovative and convincing counterexamples to 
power entailment. Fortunately, the argument for the-
ological fatalism does not depend on formulating an 
uncontroversial power entailment principle. 
Fischer argues that better versions of Pike’s argument 
replace power entailment principles with fixity of the 
past principles. The idea is to restrict what an agent 
can do at a time to actions that are counterfactually 
independent of the hard facts in the past. The initial 
version of the fixity of the past principle is (FP).
FP.  For any action Y, agent S, and time t, if it is true 
that if S were to do Y at t, some hard fact about the 
past relative to t would not have been a fact, then S 
cannot at t do Y at t.
(FP) offers a necessary condition on what an agent 
can do at a time t. The restriction in (FP) is a neces-
sary condition on what an agent can do in the relevant 
sense of ‘can’.7 An agent S can do Y at t only if were S 
to do Y at t then every hard fact about the past might 
still have been a fact.8 According to (FP), S can, in the 
relevant sense, do Y at t even if in some of the closest 
worlds in which S does Y at t, some of the hard facts 
about the past are different. 
Fischer does not deny that there are true backtrack-
ing counterfactuals of the form were S to do Y at t it 
would be true that some hard fact in the past relative 
to t would not have been a fact. He allows, that is, that 
it might be true in all of the closest worlds in which S 
does Y at t that some hard fact in the past is not a fact. 
So, of course there is a sense in which S can do Y at t 
despite the fact that doing Y at t is not counterfactu-
ally independent of hard facts holding in the past. But 
S cannot in the relevant sense do Y at t. 
The relevant sense of ‘can’ is difficult to pin down pre-
cisely. In cases where performing Y is not counter-
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factually independent of the past hard facts, S can do 
Y at t in the same sense, say, that S can leap a tall 
building in a single bound. There are worlds in which 
S does so, but those worlds do not show that S can in 
the relevant sense leap a tall building. 
Fischer advances (FP) in support of a revised argu-
ment for theological fatalism. The argument of course 
stipulates that God has the traditional divine attrib-
utes including essential sempiternality.  We suppose 
that God exists and that S actually does Y at t2. It 
seems evident that the divine attributes entail that (1) 
and (2) are false.
1. If S were to refrain from doing Y at t2, then God 
would have held a false belief at t1.
2. If S were to refrain from doing Y at t2, then God 
would not have existed at t1. 
(1) is false in virtue of God’s essential omniscience 
and (2) is false in virtue of God’s necessary existence. 
It is impossible that God believes a false proposition 
and it is impossible that God fails to exist. But con-
sider (3).
3. If S were to refrain from doing Y at t2, then God 
would have held a different belief from the one He 
actually held at t1, i.e., God would have believed 
at t1 that S would refrain from doing Y at t2.
 
The backtracking counterfactual in (3) appears to be 
true. Indeed, the truth of backtracking counterfactu-
als like (3) have been taken as evidence that God’s 
beliefs are not counterfactually independent of what 
we can do now.9 Nevertheless, Fischer argues—quite 
unexpectedly—that (3) and (FP) entail instead that S 
cannot refrain from doing Y at t2. 
… if (3) were true, then it would seem to follow 
in virtue of (FP) that S cannot refrain from doing 
Y at t2.10
Here (FP) and (3) entail that S cannot refrain from 
doing Y at t2. We might have expected the fact that 
S refrains from doing Y at t2 and (3) to entail that 
(FP) is false. Roughly, the alternatives are the follow-
ing: (i) if S could refrain from Y at t2, then past fore-
knowledge wouldn’t be fixed, but it is, so S cannot do 
that versus (ii) if past foreknowledge were fixed then S 
couldn’t refrain from doing Y at t2, but he can, so past 
foreknowledge isn’t fixed. 
It is worth noting that Fischer acknowledges some 
well-known support for the view that God’s beliefs 
are not counterfactually independent of what we can 
do now. But Fischer argues that these examples are 
all question begging. Consider, for instance, Alvin 
Plantinga’s well-received “carpenter ants” counter-
example. Plantinga argues that there is an action an 
agent can now perform which is such that if he were 
to perform it, God would not have believed that a 
colony of carpenter ants moved into Paul’s yard last 
Saturday.
. . .if Paul were to mow his lawn this afternoon, 
then the ants would not have moved in last Sat-
urday. But it is within Paul’s power to mow this 
afternoon. There is therefore an action he can per-
form such that if he were to perform it, then the 
proposition [that the colony of carpenter ants 
moved into Paul’s yard last Saturday] would have 
been false.11
Fischer’s objection is that the italicized sentence 
above begs the very point at issue. While it is intu-
itively true that it is within Paul’s power to mow the 
lawn this afternoon—that is certainly the view that 
commonsense invites us to believe—it is just this re-
ceived opinion concerning what we can do that the 
argument for theological fatalism calls into question. 
Indeed theological fatalism calls into question many 
powers and abilities that we commonsensically be-
lieve we have.
Fischer’s dialectical move in response to these exam-
ples is fascinating in part because it leaves one won-
dering what could possibly count as showing that 
God’s beliefs are not counterfactually independent of 
what we can do now. It is not enough, according to 
Fischer, to discover an action A which is such that (i) 
A is a paradigmatically something S can do and (ii) 
were S to perform A, then God would have held be-
liefs distinct from the one’s he actually holds. Notice 
that (i) and (ii) are exactly what David Lewis offers in 
defense of the view that the time traveler can kill his 
grandfather. 
Grandfather died in his bed in 1957, while Tim 
was a young boy. But when Tim has built his 
time machine and traveled to 1920, suddenly he 
realizes that he is not too late after all. He buys 
a rifle; he spends long hours in target practice; 
he shadows Grandfather to learn the route of 
his daily walk to the munitions works; he rents 
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a room along the route; and there he lurks, one 
winter day in 1921, rifle loaded, hate in his heart, 
as Grandfather walks closer, closer,. . . . Tim can 
kill Grandfather. He has what it takes. Conditions 
are perfect in every way: the best rifle money could 
buy, Grandfather an easy target only twenty yards 
away, not a breeze, door securely locked against in-
truders. Tim a good shot to begin with and now at 
the peak of training, and so on. What’s to stop him? 
The forces of logic will not stay his hand! No 
powerful chaperone stands by to defend the past 
from interference. . . In short, Tim is as much able 
to kill Grandfather as anyone ever is to kill anyone.12
Emphasizing the time traveler’s intuitive ability to kill 
his grandfather is central to Lewis’s argument that he 
can do it. Can we seriously deny that Tim can move 
his index finger and trigger the rifle? That cannot be 
right. What more do we need to show that S can do 
Y at t and were S to do Y at t then some alleged hard 
fact about the past would not be a fact?
A second fascinating consequence concerns the eval-
uation of backtracking counterfactuals. Suppose God 
knows at 50 A.D. in world w that S will do A at t and 
suppose P is the totality of past facts in w up to time 
t. Is it true in w that S can do ~A at t?  Fischer urges 
that S cannot do ~A at t since doing ~A at t would 
require S to do something that is inconsistent with 
some hard facts in P.  Since the hard facts in P are 
fixed, it is false in w that S can do ~A at t. What would 
nicely explain why S cannot do ~A at t is that S’s do-
ing so would bring about the impossible. It would 
bring about the impossible given the unalterable facts 
about S’s powers or abilities and the unalterable facts 
about the past. In order to do ~A at t, S would have 
to alter some fixed historical fact, and no one can do 
that. S would have to bring about a world in which S 
does something that is inconsistent with hard facts in 
P. S can’t do that. 
But this is not what Fischer says or holds. He says 
that we can entertain the possibility that S does ~A 
at t. What we are entertaining—S’s doing ~A at t—is 
not impossible after all. Were S to do ~A at t, accord-
ing to Fischer, then some hard fact about the past rel-
ative to t would not have been a fact. Nothing impos-
sible would have occurred had S done ~A at t. What 
then explains why S can’t do it?  Presumably it’s the 
principles of fixity that are supposed to explain why S 
cannot do ~A at t. But how, exactly?
The fixity of the past is an important metaphysical 
feature of the actual world, according to Fischer, that 
restricts what we can do now. The problem is that we 
just do not assess backtracking counterfactuals in ways 
that keep fixed all of the hard facts that fixity princi-
ples insist are fixed. According to principles of fixity, 
God’s past beliefs are among those important fixed 
facts. But when we assess the truth of backtracking 
counterfactuals—when we consider the closest worlds 
in which the antecedent of a backtracking counterfac-
tual is true—we simply do not keep fixed God’s be-
liefs. We do not keep those facts fixed in the way that 
we standardly keep past facts fixed when assessing 
backtracking counterfactuals. The way we keep past 
facts fixed in assessing backtracking counterfactuals is 
to treat them as counterfactually independent of what 
we do now. To be fixed is to be independent.
Compare the assessment of backtracking counter-
factuals in the context of causal determinism. If it is 
causally determined that I not raise my hand, what 
would have happened had I raised it?
 . . . at least one of three things would have been 
true. Contradictions would have been true to-
gether; or the historical proposition H would not 
have been true; or the law proposition L would 
not have been true. Which? . . . Of our three al-
ternatives, we may dismiss the first; for if I had 
raised my hand, there would still have been no 
true contradictions. Likewise we may dismiss the 
second; for if I had raised my hand, the intrinsic state 
of the world long ago would have been no different. 
That leaves the third alternative. If I had raised 
my hand, the law proposition L would not have 
been true.13
If I had raised my hand then the historical facts that 
constitute the intrinsic state of the world in the past 
would have remained unchanged. Those histori-
cal facts are fixed and therefore counterfactually in-
dependent of what we do now. And of course they 
therefore do not affect what I can do now.  
If God’s beliefs are among the fixed facts in the past, 
we should expect them to be counterfactually inde-
pendent of what we do now.  And, in fact, as we will 
see, that is what we do find. We will also find that the 
counterfactual independence of those past facts does 
not constrain what we can do now.
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Endurantist Tensing
According to endurantism, objects persist by hav-
ing multiple locations through time. The entire per-
sisting object—not a mere temporal part or stage of 
the object—is located at time t and then again lo-
cated at time t’.14 Of course, endurantists agree that 
objects can and do undergo change from one time to 
the next. An ounce of clay might be cubical at time 
t and, at another time t’, the very same ounce of clay 
might be spherical. The question is how such ordi-
nary change could happen. How is this commonsense 
view of persistence—the view that objects persist by 
being wholly present at various temporal locations—
consistent with the fact that objects undergo change. 
How could one and the same identical object be cubi-
cal and spherical?
The simple solution seems to involve indexing proper-
ties of the clay to times. On this analysis we find that 
the piece of clay is spherical at t and cubical at t’. The 
tension in exemplifying both cubicality and spher-
icality is quickly resolved. The clay does not in fact 
exemplify either of those monadic properties. Instead 
it stands in two different relations to time. The clay 
stands in the spherical at relation to one time t’ and 
in the cubical at relation to another time t. We could 
replace those relations with relational properties, if 
that seems more suitable. The clay would then have 
the relational properties bearing-spherical-at-to-t’ 
and bearing-cubical-at-to-t. These are properties con-
structed out of relations. And of course the clay stands 
in both relations, or has both relational properties, at 
all times at which the clay exists. For any time t, it is 
true at t that the clay bears-cubical-at-to-t and bears-
spherical-at-to-t’. The clay of course appears spherical 
at t and appears cubical at t’, but the clay at t is in fact 
indiscernible from the clay at t’. There is no property 
that the clay exemplifies at t that it does not exemplify 
at t’ and vice versa. Since the clay at t just is the clay at 
t’, on this simple analysis, it is a consequence of Lei-
bniz’s law (of the indiscernibility of identicals) that it 
must exemplify the same properties at t and t’.
Endurantists do not in general endorse the simple 
account of how objects persist. Better accounts reject 
the proposal that the clay does not exemplify the mo-
nadic properties of being cubical or being spherical. 
A better alternative is to index the copula to times, or 
to ‘tense the copula’, rather than index properties to 
times. Instead of saying that the clay bears-cubical-
at-to-t or that the clay stands in the cubical at relation 
to time t, we say that the clay is at t cubical or the clay 
has at t the property of being cubical.15 
Indexing the copula to times also permits us to say 
consistently that the clay is<at t> cubical and the clay 
is<at t’> spherical and, for that matter, the clay is<at 
n> F, for any time n and property F whatsoever. And 
again Leibniz’s laws entail that the clay must have all 
of those properties at every time at which it exists, 
since the relation holding between the ‘objects’ exist-
ing at different times is the relation of identity.
Now, consider what an omniscient God believes at 
50 A.D. about the properties of the clay. The clay is 
cubical at a certain time t and the clay is spherical at 
another time t’, there is no question about that. But 
could God believe at 50 A.D. that the clay is cubical 
and that the very same clay is spherical? Certainly not, 
or at least not consistently. Being cubical and being 
spherical are intrinsic properties of the clay that are 
inconsistent with each other; nothing can be both. If 
God believes at 50 A.D. that the clay is cubical, then 
the clay cannot be spherical as well. 
But we obviously do not want God’s beliefs at 50 
A.D. to entail that the clay cannot change from one 
time to the next. And endurantists offer an analysis 
of persistence according to which God can believe at 
50 A.D. that the clay is cubical and that the clay is 
spherical. What God in fact believes is that the clay 
is<at t> cubical and that the clay is<at t’> spherical. 
These beliefs are perfectly consistent. God’s beliefs at 
50 A.D. that the clay is<at t> cubical is perfectly con-
sistent with God’s belief at 50 A.D. that the clay is<at 
t’> spherical. And of course it is perfectly possible that 
the clay is<at t> cubical and is<at t’> spherical. Given 
the endurantist analysis, God’s beliefs do not preclude 
the clay from changing over time and exemplifying 
both of those properties. 
Endurantism and Fatalism
 
In discussion of Fischer’s argument for theological 
fatalism, we noted that if God believes at t1 that S 
actually does Y at t2, then the propositions in (1) and 
(2) are false.
1. 1. If S were to refrain from doing Y at t2, then 
God would have held a false belief at t1.
2. 2. If S were to refrain from doing Y at t2, then 
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God would not have existed at t1.
Indeed, (1) and (2) are uncontroversially false. (1) is 
false because God is essentially omniscient and (2) is 
false because God exists necessarily. These are attrib-
utes of the traditional God stipulated in the argument. 
The central question is whether (3) is true. Recall that 
Fischer urges that (3) is indeed true, but that (3) to-
gether with (FP) entail that S cannot refrain from do-
ing Y at t2. 
3. 3. If S were to refrain from doing Y at t2, then 
God would have held a different belief from the 
one He actually held at t1, i.e., God would have 
believed at t1 that S would refrain from doing Y 
at t2.
Were S to do Y at t2, it would be the case that a hard 
fact about the past relative to t would not have been a 
fact. The hard fact that precludes S from failing to do 
Y at t2 is God’s belief at t1 that S does Y at t2. 
But (FP) and God’s beliefs at t1—granting that those 
beliefs are indeed hard facts in the past—do not in 
fact preclude S from refraining from doing Y at t2. 
Since Fischer grants that (3) is true, we know that 
there’s a possible world w’ in which S refrains from 
doing Y at t. And since God is essentially omniscient, 
God knows that there is a world in which S refrains 
from doing Y at t. 
But the endurantist will ask how it is possible that 
one and the same identical person, S, has the property 
of refraining from doing Y at t in one world and the 
property of doing Y at t in another world. The prob-
lem of course is perfectly analogous to the problem of 
temporal persistence. The problem of temporal per-
sistence was how the clay could have the property of 
being cubical at one time and the property of being 
spherical at another time. The simple solution recall 
was to analyze the monadic properties as implicitly 
relational properties. The better solution was to pre-
serve the monadic properties and instead index the 
having of properties to specific times. Indexing the 
copula to times makes it possible for an object to have 
at t the property F and to have at t’ the property ~F. 
Temporally indexing the copula preserves consistency. 
Temporally enduring objects can have both of those 
properties. 
Temporally indexing the copula also permits God to 
believe at 50 A.D. that, over time, S does Y and that S 
refrains from doing Y. God cannot have both beliefs 
unless those ‘doings’ are somehow indexed to times. 
For instance, God might have the belief that S does<at 
t> Y and the belief that S refrains from doing<at t’> Y. 
The result otherwise—the result of indexing neither 
the ‘doings’ nor the properties to times—is hyperfatal-
ism. If God believes at 50 A.D. that S does Y—rather 
than S does<at t> Y—then S cannot do anything in-
consistent with doing Y at any other time in S’s exist-
ence! Of course, even fatalists reject hyperfatalism and 
instead index ‘doings’ to times.
But temporally indexing the copula does not preserve 
consistency in cases of transworld change. It might be 
the case that the clay is cubical in one possible world 
w and the very same clay, at the same time, is spherical 
in another possible world w’. Similarly, it might be 
the case that S does Y in one possible world w and, 
at the same time, S refrains from doing Y in another 
possible world w’. Temporal indexing does nothing to 
rescue consistency in cases of transworld change for 
persons or objects. The analysis in (6) and (7) is as far 
as temporal indexing can go towards consistency.
6.  S does<at t> Y
7.  S refrains from doing<at t> Y
It is obvious on inspection that the propositions in (6) 
and (7) are inconsistent. S cannot both do<at t> Y and 
refrain from doing<at t> Y. 
There seem to be two options available to the endur-
antist. We could simply deny that possible worlds 
overlap with respect to individuals. S exists, we can 
stipulate, in one possible world w and his counterpart 
S’ exists in another possible world w’, and S ≠ S’. Since 
there is no transworld identity we have no problem 
with the consistency of (6) and (7). Those proposi-
tions become on proper analysis (6’) and (7’).
6’.  S does<at t> Y
7’.  S’ refrains from doing<at t> Y
It’s obvious on inspection that (6’) and (7’) are con-
sistent. S is diverse from S’, so both propositions could 
be true. But endurantists might instead argue that 
possible worlds do overlap with respect to individ-
uals—that objects and persons in fact endure across 
worlds—and index the exemplification of properties 
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to both times and worlds. To preserve consistency in 
the exemplification of properties across times and 
worlds, endurantism analyzes (6) and (7) as (6’’) and 
(7’’).
6’’.  S does<t, w> Y.
7’’.  S refrains from doing<t, w’> Y.
(6’’) and (7’’) are the most natural analyses for those 
who find endurantism—the commonsense account 
of persistence—an appealing position. Since w is di-
verse from w’, (6’’) and (7’’) are perfectly consistent. 
The analysis makes it possible for S to endure though 
change and worlds. Indeed it is true in every possible 
world in which S exists that (6’’) and (7’’) are true. 
The endurantist analysis that yields (6’’) and (7’’) has 
the major advantage of showing why the fixity argu-
ments for theological fatalism are unsound. Consider 
the propositions in (1), (2), and (3) above. If S were to 
refrain from doing Y at t2, then God would not have 
a false belief and God would not cease to exist. (1) 
and (2) are false under the analysis in (6’’). The only 
proposition that concerns us, once again, is (3). 
3.    If S were to refrain from doing Y at t2, then God 
       would have held a different belief from the one 
       He actually held at t1.
Consider what God actually believes at time t1 in our 
world w. God has the belief in (8), since it is true that 
S does<t2, w> Y, where w is the actual world.
8.   God believes at t1 that S does<t2, w> Y.
Now let w’ be the closest world to the actual world 
in which S refrains from doing Y at t2. Were S to 
refrain from doing Y at t, then w’ would be actual and 
it would be true that S refrains from doing<t2, w’> Y. 
So, God also has the belief in (9).
9.    God believes at t1 that S refrains from doing<t2, 
       w’> Y.
The beliefs in (8) and (9) are consistent and God ac-
tually has both beliefs. The fact that God believes at 
t1 that S does<t2, w> Y does not entail that God does 
not believe at t1 that S refrains from doing<t2, w’> Y. 
Indeed, (8) and (9) are true in every possible world 
in which God exists. This is because S does<t2, w> Y 
and S refrains from doing<t2, w’> Y are true in every 
world, just as S does<at t> Y and S refrains from do-
ing<at t’> Y are true at all times. 
We should conclude that (3) is false, and that the ar-
gument for theological fatalism is unsound. If S re-
frains from doing Y at t, then God would have ex-
actly the same beliefs he actually has. Indeed, there 
would be no change at all in God’s beliefs. This is 
exactly the sort of result we should expect if God’s 
beliefs are among the fixed facts of the past. If endur-
antism is true, then God’s beliefs are counterfactually 
independent of what we do now, just as all historical 
facts—all intrinsic states of the past—are counterfac-
tually independent of what we do now. 
There are additional reasons to expect God’s beliefs 
to be counterfactually independent of what we do 
now. The traditional God exemplifies essential immu-
tability and essentially aseity—God cannot undergo 
change and is necessarily independent of creation—so 
God’s beliefs cannot undergo change and they cannot 
be affected by any actions we undertake.
Can S refrain from doing Y at t2 in the relevant sense 
of ‘can’? According to (FA), S can refrain from doing 
Y at t2 only if were S to refrain from doing Y at t2 
then every hard fact about the past might still have 
been a fact.  And given the commonsense account 
of persistence in endurantism, that of course is true. 
Were S to refrain from doing Y at t2 then God would 
have exactly the same set of beliefs he actually has. 
There is no reason to believe, then, that S cannot re-
frain from doing Y at t2 in any sense of ‘can’.   
But consider the strongest principle of fixity, the prin-
ciple of the total fixity of the past. The principle of the 
total fixity of the past entails that there are no facts 
in the past that are not over and done with. It follows 
from total fixity that every past fact is a hard fact.  
TF. For any action Y, agent S, and time t, if it is true
       that if S were to do Y at t, some fact about the past 
    relative to t would not have been a fact, then S 
      cannot at t do Y at t.
If (TF) is true, then for any agent S and time t, the set 
of accessible worlds for S at t is just the set of worlds 
that overlap with respect to the actual past up to time 
t. We can think of the set of accessible worlds for an 
agent S as determining what S can do at a time t in 
the relevant sense of ‘can’. The set of accessible worlds 
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for S at t, then, are worlds that branch off the actual 
past. Every accessible world for S at t has the very 
same past and not simply the same hard facts. Every 
possible world for S at t must therefore be consistent 
with the actual past.
 If S were to refrain from doing Y at t, would 
the actual past be any different at all? Would any past 
facts be different from the way they actually are? The 
answer is no. Let possible worlds w and w’ branch off 
the actual past. Suppose that in w’ S refrains from do-
ing Y at t2 and in w S does Y at t2. Suppose further 
that an omniscient God exists in the actual past of 
these possible worlds and believes infallibly at t1 every 
true proposition. Does it follow that human freedom 
is affected in any way? The answer is again no. What 
God believes at t1 is that S does<w, t2> Y and that S 
refrains from doing<w’, t2> Y. These beliefs are both 
true and nothing S does in any possible world is in-
consistent with these beliefs.16 
Conclusions 
The endurantist analysis of persistence is inde-
pendently motivated. So the endurantist argument 
against theological fatalism is not ad hoc. The index-
ing of ‘doings’ to times is already accepted in every 
formulation of the problem of theological fatalism. It 
can hardly be complained that the endurantist solu-
tion indexes doings to worlds as well as times, since 
that is independently required for endurantist analy-
ses for transworld individuals.
We could, of course, reject the transworld identity of 
individuals in favor of worldbound individuals. This 
amounts to the view that no individuals exist in more 
than one possible world. But the argument for theo-
logical fatalism would fail again. God’s beliefs at t1, 
as noted above, would then be that S does<at t2> Y 
and S’ (some counterpart of S) refrains from doing<at 
t2> Y, where S ≠ S’. There is no inconsistency in those 
beliefs, so the fact that S’ refrains from doing<at t2> Y 
does not entail that God’s beliefs are not identical to 
his actual beliefs.
Endurantism aims to explain how an individual S 
can persist—genuinely persist as the self-same indi-
vidual—through change over time and across possi-
ble worlds. The endurantist explanation of individual 
persistence also explains how an omniscient being can 
have consistent beliefs about the very same individual 
through change over times and across possible worlds. 
The endurantist account of individual persistence 
thereby explains what goes wrong in arguments from 
principles of fixity to theological fatalism. 
 
Acknowledgment
Many thanks to Mark Bernstein for comments on an 
earlier draft of this paper.
Endnotes
[1] See Nelson Pike, ‘Divine Omniscience and Vol-
untary Action’, Philosophical Review 74 (1965) 27-46.
[2] See John Martin Fischer, ‘Soft Facts and Harsh 
Realities: Reply to William Craig’, Religious Studies, 
Vol. 27, No. 4 (1991) 523-539.
[3]  On one reading of Pike, God’s foreknowledge is 
counterfactually independent of what we can now do. 
If the set of actions we can perform is S = {X, Y}, then 
God’s foreknowledge F is counterfactually independ-
ent of what we can do just in case X ☐⟶ F and Y 
☐⟶ F. Of course there might also be some action Z 
that you perform in some possible world such that Z 
☐⟶ ~F. But Z is therefore not in the set S of actions 
you can perform. Ockhamists deny that God’s fore-
knowledge is counterfactually independent of what 
we can do, so Ockhamists would not exclude Z from 
S.
[4]  I assume there is no Russell paradox in stipulating 
a set of all past facts.
[5] There are several problems here that I can’t ad-
dress. There is a problem with an omniscient being’s 
knowledge of indefinitely true propositions, proposi-
tions that are true under some, but not all, admissible 
precisifications. There are larger worries for indefi-
nitely definitely true propositions, and other high-
er order vague propositions. There is also a familiar 
concern with quantifying over all true propositions. 
The collection of all true propositions is too big to 
be a set. The domain of true propositions would have 
to be a class or some other kind of collection. Nor-
man Kretzmann has argued that an omniscient being 
could not have de se or first-person knowledge of in-
dividual agents—the knowledge that Jones has when, 
for instance, he knows that he’s in the hospital (even 
if he fails to know that Jones is in the hospital). See 
Norman Kretzmann, ‘Omniscience and Immutabili-
Science, Religion & Culture
2017 | Volume 4 | Special Issue 2 | Page 55                                                      
                              
ty’, Journal of Philosophy, 63(14) (1966): 409–421 and 
Patrick Grim, ‘Against Omniscience: The Case from 
Essential Indexicals’,  Noûs, 19(2) (1985) 151–180. 
See also John Hawthorne, ‘Vagueness and the Mind 
of God’, Philosophical Studies (2005) 1-25.
[6] Phil Quinn, ‘Plantinga on Foreknowledge and 
Freedom’. In J. E. Tomberlin & P. van Inwagen (eds.) 
Profiles: Alvin Plantinga (Dordrechet-Holland: D. 
Reidel Publishing, 1985) 271–287.
Thomas Talbott, ‘On Divine Foreknowledge and 
Bringing about the Past’, Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, 46, (1985) 455–469.
[7] The exact sense of ‘can’ and ‘cannot’ in play in these 
discussions is both fascinating and extraordinarily 
elusive. I argue below that the right sense in which 
S cannot bring about p at t is in fact that p is false in 
every possible world accessible to S at t. 
[8] I make the standard assumption here that the ne-
gation of the would-counterfactual ~(A ◻︎⟶ ~B) is 
the might-counterfactual A♢⟶ B.
[9] See Alvin Plantinga, ‘On Ockham’s Way Out’, 
Faith and Philosophy, 3, (1986): 235–69. 
John T. Saunders, ‘Of God and Freedom’, The Philo-
sophical Review, 75, (1966): 219–225.
[10] See John Martin Fischer, ‘Foreknowledge, Free-
dom, and the Fixity of the Past’, Philosophia
[11] See Alvin Plantinga, ‘On Ockham’s Way Out’, 
Faith and Philosophy, 3, (1986) 254 ff.
[12] See David Lewis, ‘The Paradoxes of Time Travel’ 
American Philosophical Quarterly (1976) 149 ff. Italics 
throughout are mine.
[13] See David Lewis, ‘Are We Free to Break Laws?’ 
Theoria 3 (1981) p. 114. See also his ‘Counterfactual 
Dependence and Time’s Arrow’, Nous 13 (1979) 455-
476. My emphasis.
[14] Some objects do not persist by enduring, of 
course, such as events and processes, baseball games, 
concerts and the like.
[15]  See Mark Johnston, Particulars and Persistence 
(Princeton: Princeton University Ph.D. dissertation 
1984) and his ‘Is There a Problem about Persistence?’ 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supp. vol. 61 
(1987) 107-135. Se also Frank Jackson, ‘Metaphysics 
by Possible Cases’ Monist 77 (1994) 93-110, David 
Lewis, ‘Tensing the Copula’, Mind 111 (2002) 1-14, 
and Sally Haslanger, ‘Endurance and Temporary In-
trinsics’ Analysis 49 (1989) 119-25.
[16] Some endurantists, of course, are presentists. 
What if we tried to formulate the argument for the-
ological fatalism on the presentist assumption there 
exist no persons or objects that are not present. There 
exist, in particular, no past persons or objects and 
there obtain no past states of affairs or facts. The ar-
gument for presentist fatalism must argue that a state 
of affairs that obtained at t1 but does not obtain at 
t2—viz., God’s believing that S will do A at t2—is 
nonetheless at t2 a hard fact that constrains what S 
can do at t2. How could a state of affairs that does 
not obtain at t2 be a hard fact that constrains what S 
does at t2? How could a hard fact that does not ob-
tain constrain what anyone can do at t2? Compare an 
analogue to presentism from actualism about possible 
worlds. Suppose it is true in some possible, non-actual 
world w that God believes that S does A in the actual 
world w’. Grant that God is infallible in w and that 
God’s belief in w entails that S does A in the actual 
world w’. Could a state of affairs that obtains in some 
possible, non-actual world w—but in fact does not 
obtain—constrain what S can do in the actual world 
w’? Isn’t it obvious that it could not? S’s behavior in 
the actual world w’ can only be constrained by facts 
or states of affairs that obtain in w’. Similarly, what S 
does at t can only be constrained by facts or states of 
affairs that actually obtain. What S does at t cannot be 
constrained by some fact that did obtain but presently 
doesn’t. Note that God does not believe at t2 that S 
does A at t2 until S does A at t2. But compare Mi-
chael C. Rea, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 
84, No. 4, (2006) 511– 524 and Michael Rea and Ali-
cia Finch, ‘Presentism and Ockham’s Way Out’, Ox-
ford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Vol. 1 (Oxford; 
Oxford University Press, 2008) 1-17. 
